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August 24, 2011

BODIES, by Susie Orbach [Introduction, Chapters 1 & 2]


Susie Orbach

In a previous post mostly about other matters I pulled a few quotations from Orbach's book Bodies. I'd now like to look a bit more carefully at this book.

One of its dominant claims, reiterated variously and copiously supported is that in the contemporary world, our bodies status has changed quite radically. 
The individual is now deemed accountable for his or her body and judged by it. "Looking after oneself" is a moral value. The body is becoming akin to a worthy personal project (5). […] We can fashion it through artifice, through the naturalistic routes of bio-organic products or through a combination of these, but whatever the means, our body is our calling card, vested with showing the results of our hard work and watchfulness or, alternatively, our failure and sloth (6).
This change in body consciousness is coincident with a change in how bodies are used. Orbach observes that, at least in the west, few of us make things any more (7). Rather than being tinkers or tailors or whatever, a huge percentage of us spend our days sitting in front of computers, and/or doing service jobs of whatever sort. Our bodies are still shaped by our work, but not as they were in the past. Now, given the image saturation of our lives, so much of which figures bodies for us to desire or identify with or aspire to, "Our bodies are and have become a form of work. The body is turning from being the means of production to the production itself" (8).

While the common cultural "wisdom" everywhere insists that this change is for the good, Orbach diagnoses a profound instability in contemporary body consciousness. While she argues that "the natural body is fiction" (8) she also contends "that current cultural discourse on the body means that we have entered a new epoch of body destabilization, and that there is a new franticness surrounding the body induced by social forces which are absorbed and transmitted in the family, where we first acquire our bodily sense" (9). 
What Freud showed us, first of all, was that a "natural" human sexuality was a misperception. Sexual desire is replete with conflict, longing and fantasy. In our epoch, I contend, the body itself has grown as complicated a place as sexuality was for Freud's. It too is shaped and misshaped by our earliest encounters with parents and carers, who also contain in themselves the forces and imperatives of our culture, with its panoply of injunctions about how the body should appear and be attended to. Their sense of their own bodily lacks and strengths, their hopes and fears about physicality, will play themselves out on the child. (12)
This is an interesting thesis, that "the body itself has grown as complicated a place as sexuality was" and one which I find I am swayed by. Certainly Orbach's book provides a great deal of evidence to support the contention. She also says in the first chapter of this text that "New theories of psychological development are required to address the primary terrain of our human physicality, and in this book I suggest ways of thinking about the body that provide, I believe, the starting points for a theory of body development just as compelling as our existing theories of mind" (13-4). So, my task as I work through this will be to see just what those starting points are.

Everything above is from the Introduction, I turn now to Chapter 1 "Bodies in Our Time"…

This chapter goes in some surprising directions. It opens with and returns often to the story of "Andrew" a man who spent a great deal of time searching for someone to remove parts of his body. He felt that he could never feel "whole" - what did he wish to lose? Both legs above the knee. Orbach acknowledges how creepy this can make people feel but she is interested in what desires Andrew has which would produce this feeling in him. As it turns out, because Andrew was never able to convince anyone to lop off both of his legs, in time he did it himself and - per his doctor's subsequent reports - Andrew is doing much better psychologically now without them. But one cannot help but to wish that there was more information about this. Better how? & in a lacanian mode, the quest to feel "whole" is clearly Imaginary and neither the loss of the legs or any other change to the physical body can possibly be the solitary obstacle preventing the impossibility of wholeness from being achieved. 

Orbach also spends some time talking about phantom limbs and citing some of the better research about this phenomena (22-3). This part was all quite interesting and seems to have solid support. Briefly, the situation seems to be that the body remaps itself and might derive sensations from the absent, now phantom, limb, from some other place on the body. She mentions one subject who lost a leg from the knee down who now feels it pulsing and tingling when he has an orgasm (23). Coming out of this discussion she then turns to the feeling of being "born in the wrong body" familiar now in the cultural discourse about transgender. Orbach admits to her initial difficulties working with transpersons and also her eventual acceptance of their claim to have been "born in the wrong body." These are complicated issues and questions and as much as I like Orbach's book, I wish she had spent a bit more time on these in this chapter rather than reiterating so many of the claims about the body made in the intro. There is also something in this discussion that bothers me too, but I'll get there in a moment.

In a footnote to this chapter Orbach mentions a guy named Jonathan Miller who in discussing the work by Ramachandran on phantom limbs said something interesting (though he is not quoted directly, this is Orbach): 
Jonathan Miller (…) made a profound point about the body-brain relationship when he suggested that we all have phantom limbs all of the time and that it is only when we lose an actual limb that we become aware of the fact that our idea and experience of the limb live in the brain. (ch.1 n.5)
Again this invokes the Imaginary for anyone with a lacanian approach. I also like Miller's idea a lot. The Imaginary Body is surely a phantom body, just as much as the mirror image is. I'll track down the references Orbach provides for this note eventually, but I can't help but to wish that she'd foregrounded this 'phantom' quality of the body more strongly here and throughout the book.

Now my gripe with this chapter. As I said already, Orbach is very compassionate and understanding about the feeling of being "born in the wrong body" and she takes very seriously, without pathologizing, the desire to have one's genitals refashioned. I cannot escape some thoughts about the Imaginary in this connection, as noted above. None of us will ever be "whole" in this perspective. As such, if the idea is that sexual reassignment is the cure for everything a persons suffers or that it will make anyone a whole, complete, person, etc - then I cannot not see a fantasy here which could impose even greater suffering when it fails to be the solution to all things. But at the same time, I suspect that many people who seek this do not assume that it will solve every problem at all and they are, in Orbach's terms, seeking a physical body that reflects better their own self-conception. In that sense, it does not seem that radically different from my desire to lose a few pounds around the middle, or to wish my thinning hair would return to its lost fullness. But what troubles me in Orbach's discussion is a feeling that the desire for sexual reassignment is the litmus test for authentic trans experience. Here is the passage that most troubles me in Orbach's chapter;
For Aleshia Brevard, as for Michaela [two M2F transwomen discussed earlier in the text], there was a tangible need to change her body. Not for her the adaptation of cross-dressers such as Thai lady boys, the young men who masquerade as beautiful young women for the delectation of Western men whose homosexuality shames them in ways that lead them to seek out masculine bodies disguised as those of young women. (26)
The more I think through the implications here the more I am bugged by this passage. First let's consider the position attributed to "Thai lady boys". In Orbach's account what they do begins and ends with cross-dressing. These persons are seemingly inauthentic, and presumably cross-dressing itself is inauthentic somehow as well, or perhaps it is only inauthentic as an exemplification of transgender desire. What bugs me about this is its sweeping inaccuracy. I have a friend who is not Thai but Malay and who was thrown out of the house - once and for all - at a very young age because s/he thought and felt herself to be a she and her father wanted her to remain a son. This person lives her life as a woman, but still has the genitals she was born with, though she has used hormones and was saving money for breast implants. The last time we spoke about these things she was not interested in having her genitals refashioned. But what bugs me is the idea that unless one wishes to take this specific step that there is something somehow false or inauthentic going on. Perhaps in Orbach's understanding, a "Thai lady boy" is a person who has no self-identification as a woman at all and is rather a young man who pretends as such while being a prostitute. But really now - one need look no further than wikipedia to read about "Kathoeysin Thailand and elsewhere and while it is true that a disproportionate amount of such persons find no other work than as prostitutes, this does not seem enough of a fact to sustain her claim here. It is tempting to see Orbach herself as caught up in a sort of genital essentialism, which even if it mirrors the desire of some transgendered persons to refashion their own genitals, seems wholly inadequate as a way of measuring the authenticity of anyone's desire. A couple of years ago I read Don Kulick's fabulous, fascinating and at times scary book Travesti (about this book, or download it here). And as this book discusses at great length, Travestis for the most part do not want to lose their male genitals, and think of themselves as a 'third sex'. They even ridicule the desire to surgically alter the genitals in this way (while going to great and dangerous lengths to alter the shapes of their asses). Their condemnation of people who decide to do this is surely problematic, but it would seem just as problematic to condemn those who do not make this decision, as, it feels to me, Orbach does. 

Also troubling about this passage in Orbach is how the imputed inauthenticity of the Thai lady boy is not really even considered as such. What seems to prove it to Orbach is the other for whom she sees it as constructed and why. She writes, that they do this "for the delectation of Western men whose homosexuality shames them in ways that lead them to seek out masculine bodies disguised as those of young women" (26). Are we really to assume that the many thousands of people who do this, often starting at very young ages, do so for no other reasons than to sell their bodies to Western men? & then, let us assume that there are men - why not? - who are so ashamed of their homosexual desire that they can only accept and act upon it with a trans prostitute. Even if this were true in many cases, can it really be the only answer? Is homosexual desire only authentic if its object is a male body that performs the culturally mandated masculine body as such (what of heterosexual desire)? How would Orbach judge those men who marry a lady boy and treat her as a wife from then on? Is this a marriage predicated upon shame and disavowed homosexuality? Also, her presumption seems to be that those who turn to lady boys live their lives as heterosexual men, but what if a gay man were to desire a transwoman? Would this be a case of a "gay man whose heterosexuality shames him in ways that lead him to seek out masculine bodies disguised as those of young women"?  

I do not mean to discount shame, repression, the proliferation of images, or any other force which shapes, constrains and in some cases constitutes sexual desire, but at this moment Orbach seems a bit rigid and she risks simply shifting the essentialism to a new zone - the genitals. Of course in saying that, I suspect that were she to read this, she would turn out to have rather more to say about these issues. But, I'm working with what she does have to say here. 

Her next chapter "Shaping the Body" again shifts between narratives and more scientific findings of various sorts. In hopes of getting just at the stuff that interests me and which might act as the "starting points" for a new body theory, I'll be selective here. 

The opening pages and the narratives that are offered there all incline one to support a basic point about the importance of the body image as developed in those crucial childhood years. Using lacanian language, I might say that Orbach has highlighted the ways in which the Imaginary Body is constructed, by looking primarily at what happens when its stability is challenged or demands are placed upon it which require that it be otherwise than it is. We'll all know that children learn languages better than adults, and voice is surely an embodied feature of human existence. Just like with the voice, we develop the Imaginary Body during those same crucial years. Most folks who know any Lacan know the Mirror Stage article. Fewer know anything about the Lacan of the late 60s and 70s. He is not specific about this in Seminar XVII, but as I have argued elsewhere, that seminar's "discourse theory" makes some interesting changes to his theoretical project and it seems to me that they also license us to rethink the sort of "once and for all" understandings of the mirror stage that are so common in the secondary lit. 

My position on that stuff is that the Mirror Stage essay is perhaps better understood as logically foundational, but not really needing to refer any specific moment in a child's development. As such, do we recognize what we "are" for the gaze of others via a mirror, or reflections, or by modeling what our body is like via another body? Yes, absolutely. & is that "logical moment" relatively momentous? Again, yes - but it may not happen all in a flash, it may not be a product simply of images, it is likely something which, while having to have had an originary moment, is nonetheless ongoing. That is to say, I think that the Body Imaginary - as representation of the ego - is for the subject a master signifier or a cluster of such, and as Seminar XVII makes clear (and differs from what came before in Lacan's work) master signifiers are not singular, they can and do change. If these things were not the case, how is it that I am not shocked and dismayed when I look into a mirror and fail to see myself as I was at the moment when I first recognized my image in a mirror? 

Now to return to Orbach, she discusses at some length the "mirror neuron system". Referring to certain scientific studies, Orbach summarizes the findings;
When we watch another human being making a movement, whether it is sticking out a tongue, carrying packages, swerving, dancing, eating or clapping their hands, our neurons fire in the same way, as if we ourselves were making the movement. From the brain's perspective (…) watching is pretty similar to doing. The brain has a built-in empathic and mimicking capacity. It translates what is seen through the eyes into the equivalent of doing and is structured to absorb and prepare itself for what we may have not yet mastered. (42)
The basic insight of these reflections on the mirror neuron system does not - to me at least - seem radically unlike that of the Mirror Stage essay, particularly if one does not shut it down as a sort of "once and for all" moment in our psychic development.
The mirror neuron system, then, enables us to relate at a deep level to one another. It allows us to see in the face of another what she or he is experiencing and then to have a corresponding feeling ourselves. (44) 
Orbach spends some time looking at what happens when this system is under-developed and wonders as well about the negative effects on people when it is inadequately reinforced through nurturing behaviors, specifically touch, which in "the last twenty years or so (…) has come to the fore as being crucial to psychological well-being. Touch is the most basic and fundamental of human experiences" (48). That is, the Body Imaginary (as I will persist on calling it here for the moment) is not simply an image-system, it is also comprised of tactile, kineasthetic, olfactory, auditory, and other inputs. Orbach writes;
Every gesture we make, the very way we move, our grace or lack of it, our physical confidence or unease, reflect both the country and local culture we have grown up in and the particular interpretation of our gestures that our mothers and those close to us have passed on. They do this by giving us our specific bodily gestures and guides to movement every bit as much as they give us specific words and language with which to communicate. (50)
At this point it seems clear to me that many of these scientific findings are useful to think about and that the extant accounts of psychic development in psychoanalysis need to take them on board and see where they lead. If Lacan did place too much stress on the image in the Imaginary, that is not all he had to say about it - anxiety, lust and aggression are equally Imaginary in his account and these affects (loosely called) are bodily affects (as would be all). Without again going into the question of affect for lacanian psychoanalysis or psychoanalysis more generally, I think there is an easy case to be made that the body itself needs to be brought more fully into psychoanalytic thinking.

I'll stop there for now and try to get through a couple more chapters of Orbach tomorrow. 

August 13, 2011

Cult of the Body or... ?

Some days ago I was chatting with a friend, one with whom I have gleefully pursued debauchery with great gusto many times, and I wrote this:
i’m about to start a crazy gym schedule which i hope will temper my smoking
The response was:
really?
sounds horrible. sports, no smoking, body cult, self-improvement... eeewww
... & when you put it like that, it does sound pretty bad. The line from Fight Club wandered through my head: “Self-improvement is masturbation... now self-destruction...”



… & while these remarks were qualified by my interlocutor in what came next (he too is trying to cut down on smoking), I’ve found myself since then pondering the line between the Cult of the Body and … whatever might evade that classification
Surely one modality of the superego’s commanded enjoyment in this time in the west focuses on precisely this. There are many places where Žižek makes this claim, but I was just reading a bit of Susie Orbach’s book Bodies, and it makes much the same general point when talking of the rising generation’s expectation of plastic surgery and the government’s warning us of an epidemic of obesity...
[Orbach] Your body, all these phenomena shout, is your canvas to be fixed, remade and enhanced. Join in. Enjoy. Be part of it (1). [...] Our bodies are increasingly being experienced as objects to be honed and worked on (2). Putting the body on show and making it appear “attractive” are presented as fun, desirable and easily accessible. Body beautiful and the goal of perfectibility have been democratised. Invitingly set out as available to everyone in any country in any country whatever their economic situation, the right body is trumpeted as a way of belonging in our world today (3). [...] Whether followers of fashion or health trends or not, we take for granted that looking good, for ourselves, will make us feel good (2). 
Hence the proliferation of diets (paleo, blood-type, Adkins, raw food, juicing, etc), weight or resistance-based exercise regimes (body sculpting, visual impact muscle building, vertical fitness, core training) as well as ‘stretchy’ ones (bikram aka ‘hot’ yoga, pilates, dynamic stretching, etc) and much else. It’s not just that we might want to get in shape and be healthy and so forth, we have a quasi-moral obligation to eat organic foods, free range eggs, take fish oil tablets, have a consistent cardio schedule, focus on core training, and even to relax or meditate and we can aspire to join the realm of the elect if we manage to do all of that and get ripped as well. Behold the socially-approved abdominal muscles:

One page I skimmed by told me that the body part that women find most attractive on men is a tight and toned abdomen (that’s “the other six pack”). & men want both that and a bubble butt on women between the halves of which one might crack a walnut. Similarly body-obsessed attitudes are to be found in gay culture (though we do not see a fetish for “bears” reflected in Teenbeat or Seventeen magazines). Is the lesbian community immune from this? - I suspect not, rather I suspect local variation. Craigslist personals ads in the M4T (man for tranny) category stress being “passable” and HWP (height-weight proportionate). In fact personals ads give lots of examples of this sort of mandate with regard to the body, some even shaded with guilt, as here; “I don’t mean to offend, but I just don’t feel any attraction to heavy women” or “Athletic and toned men are what I find attractive, sorry fellas.” Some years ago I was using a dating site and found a seemingly very interesting woman with whom I had a variety of overlapping interests, but then I read the text about what she was looking for which specified that she took care of her body and expected the same, thus no men with a body fat index above 12% would even be considered (looking at her pictures, I somehow doubted that she was at 12% or less, but women’s and men’s bodies are different in this regard, so she seems to have applied an unclear rule of thumb).  
We’re all familiar with critiques of the images of beauty that we are fed and absorb through advertising, how the bodies presented there are such statistical outliers that to strive to reach that ideal will of necessity lead to failure, if not bulimia, anorexia and eating disorders. Here is a bit of old news dating back to “Jan 25, 2010” (the author is Emma Hall);
Ban on ads promoting ‘cult of the body’ planned to protect young viewers
IN SPAIN, ads for diet products, some beauty treatments and plastic surgery are now officially considered more dangerous for young people than commercials for alcohol. As European governments are trying to figure out how responsible marketers and media are for the obsession of many young women with weight and idealized beauty, Spain’s government is about to pass a law banning marketers from advertising certain beauty products and services “that encourage the cult of the body” on TV before 10 p.m.
The story went on to discuss the spread of similar concerns within other EU countries.
Yet we are also treated to magazine spreads and documentaries that show us how some fat unhealthy so and so by going on a juice fast lost a huge amount of weight, felt better, looked better and also had a complete remission of a painful skin condition that had plagued him for years (I am referring here to the film Fat, Sick and Nearly Dead). And daytime television in “reality” mode actively celebrates those who - through whatever method - shed the pounds and get healthy and obey the superegoic command. 
[Orbach] We experience the wish for more perfect bodies as our own desire, as indeed it is, yet it is hard to separate out the ways bodies are seen, talked about and written about the effect of that on our personal perception of our own bodies and other bodies. The body has become a new focus in both women’s and men’s lives, no longer something secure or ordinary in itself (4). [...] Those who had previously paid little heed to fashion or health now find themselves caught up in attempts to make the best of themselves and to take responsibility for their health and well-being. The individual is now deemed accountable for his or her body and judged by it. “Looking after oneself” is a moral value. The body is becoming akin to a worthy personal project (5).  
This is a bind. No one seems to be arguing that smoking and eating McDonald’s every day, while avoiding exercise is good for you. But it seems that to begin to exercise or work out has a funny way of leading one into buying things (”enjoy!” says the superego). & of course it seems that most people would prefer to look better, be thought sexier, etc. Does anyone seriously ask what they find more attractive, fat or skinny? Undoubtedly there are those who prefer a bit more meat on the bones but increasingly aren’t such folks thought of as fetishists while others, seemingly the dominant group now, favor the tight and toned Hollywood “hard-bodies”? Fetishism here is nothing more than a function of distance from the norm.  
Uncool muscles.
& it is not simply fitness or strength which is at issue, but the right kind. Power-lifting is not thought sexy - too bulky. Sexy is lean and angular muscularity ala Tyler Durden is what’s in - and Rusty Moore, author of “Visual Impact Muscle Building” has a plethora of videos aimed both at making you spend $47 on three PDFs of his fitness plan and helping you to distinguish good muscle-boundedness from bad. “Curvy” for women has become a code-word for “heavy” and any roll at all at the waist, say when tying one’s shoes, is thought by some adolescent girls to indicate fatness. That this is nuts is something many know and yet knowing it does not seem to have much impact on the proliferation of such images as ideals. Here is a lovely example of the distinction between knowing and doing in ideology. It means little if we know, what matters is what we do - hence Pascal’s famous injunction to Kneel, whether one believes or not.
One of the most annoying things about both ex-smokers and workout fanatics is how much they talk about not smoking and working out. Ex-smokers are probably the worst, most self-righteous, most sanctimonious, etc. Not all of them of course, but enough of them to give that stereotype some grip. Fitness enthusiasts can be as talky - usually without the ‘tude of ex-smokers, but able to talk at great length about their dietary regimes and daily workout schedules, the best interval training, how much protein to take in on a work out day in light of one’s body weight and fitness goals, all of that stuff. I know, as I am sure I bored the hell out of many a few years ago when I staged my 1st “Return to the Body.” 
So, now I’ll bore anyone reading this a bit in that over-mined vein, though I’ll try to be brief. In the spring of 2008 I was feeling sickly, tired, and out of shape. In my own estimation I didn’t look good. I availed myself of the rec center at school and did the physical evaluation they offer which measures lots of stuff but includes a fat index (I scored 23% at 210lbs). I went at it hard for 3 months. When I was done I weighed 168lbs and scored 17% on the fat index thing. But what seemed most important was that I felt great, I slept well, I had plenty of energy, I ate a lot but ate healthy, my intermittent skin problems mostly disappeared and I no longer snored. & as a sop to my vanity many people that I know commented on how good I was looking. 
Right now, I am in a much worse place than where I was when I started that in 2008. I weigh almost as much as I ever have (218lbs), I’m smoking 2 packs+ a day, I eat whatever, I sleep poorly, snore, wake up coughing sometimes, hack up smoker’s wads when I roll out of bed, feel tired and run down, I wheeze at night, my chest aches sometimes, my skin issues are re-emerging, etc. I look at me and I do not like what I see. So, I am about to do it again, another “Return to the Body” - this time hoping to do a better job than previously and to keep it up (my 3 months previously got me to a plateau of sorts and though I continued to work out until the horrible December of 2008 when I began staring into the abyss, no real physical differences seemed to manifest). 
My start date is Monday 15 August. 
But I’d rather not turn into a boring body cult monologist. Something which writing this post probably ironizes somewhat. But whatever. My pledge to anyone reading this… I’ll limit posts about all of this business to 2 per calendar year (with the next one coming only in 2012).  
Yet I know that there are some people I know that would dispute some of this (even if only in the privacy of their thoughts). They will argue, and it would be difficult to counter-argue, that not smoking is better than smoking, that health is better than ill-health, that it is in some sense ‘natural’ to find a body that is healthy and fit more attractive than one which isn’t, that we ought not to be blamed for our desires and so if our desires only include men with a six pack and women with tight and tiny asses - so be it. 
I’m reminded of a beatific moment from my childhood when, having just stared into the face of an elderly black man, fascinated by his wrinkles and white whiskers and the alert awareness in his eyes, I then flopped back down onto the backseat when my mother drove away and decided that everyone was beautiful if one really looked at them. I think I was 4 or 5 at the time. I didn’t test this maxim by epiphany, I just assumed it was so. & while I have enjoyed people watching, now and then, since I was small - this conviction has not faired so well. That, or the “beauty” that I though perceptible in all - by virtue of its radical difference from the static images of beauty that the culture industry soaks us in daily - has become something else... “common humanity” perhaps, or “compassion”...
Nowadays I am just as guilty as the culture at large in preferring slender, tight and toned - even as that preference impugns the body I inhabit. When I look in the mirror there are things about this body that I do not like, and that there is undoubtedly interference - both imaginary and symbolic - between my eyes and the plane of the mirror, doesn’t seem to matter much to my affective response. 
I plugged “cult of the body” into an academic search engine and found this: “Human, mutant, machine. On the relationship of body cult and genetic engineering” by Peter Ulrich Hein & Maria Eva Hein. New Genetics and Society, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2000
This pair of German academics give the following abstract for their article “The dichotomy of artificiality and naturalness in the cult of the body at the interface of art and everyday life—rejection and acceptance of genetic engineering.” - which strikes me as a curious abstract in a number of ways, but whatever. In their text they are interested in how cultural sources prefigure or frame ‘naturalness’ vs ‘genetic engineering’ and I’m not so interested in this question, though along the way they have some interesting things to say here and there. These authors also look at things like avant garde art as well as advertisements, kitsch and much else. Here are a selection of quotes:
[...] the modern role models of a so-called ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ person are largely nothing but fiction [...] —a fiction which is hardly aware of its fictitious character and is misunderstood as being natural.
The more nature is threatened as the basis of life, the more important it appears to assert it in the microcosm of everyday life, for example by healthy eating habits, fitness training and in the exhibition of ideal bodily measurements.
They propose 4 aspects of the body cult;
Firstly the cult of the beautiful body, a rather simplistic-naturalistic orientation; the cult of the artificial and virtual body, with which the reflection of the technical potential is moved to the sphere of fiction; the cult of the deformed body, which offers itself descriptively to critically in avant-garde art, in advertising rather more affirmatively, and finally the cult of the healthy body, where explicit statements against genetic engineering are uttered (319).
Writing of The cult of the beautiful body, Hein and Hein first recognize that many things deemed to be science fiction in the past are increasingly viable options in the present and that  “The ‘consumer-designed baby’ is a realistic option, the body designed and cloned in engineering by far no longer a figment of the imagination.” Next they observe that
[...] the production of the body as a commodity is experiencing a boom. Styling, bodybuilding and contouring serve to upgrade one’s own body. Role models such as athletes and models show an artificially tuned beauty as the instant customized ideal of style. Consumer-oriented medicine offers modifications of body shape, implantation technologies, skin transplants, the deep freezing of tissue, liposuction, plastic surgery of the sexual organs and muscle and breast implants made of silicone. Despite such large-scale surgical, chemical and medical manipulations of the natural aging process, body culture vies with the ideal of natural health and intactness. The old eighteenth-century saying ‘Nature is raised by art’ is old hat today. On the contrary: natural nutrition, healthy, natural living (diet), physical training (fitness), etc. are as much part of the body cult as artificial modifications for the involution of a nature-given body image (320). 
…I would dispute the claim of the body as a commodity here somewhat, but the general drift of this seems spot on. My issue with thinking of one’s own body as commodity is that in buying a Thigh-Master or going on some no-carb diet or whatever, the thing *bought* is the commodity - the Thigh-Master machine or the book on the Adkins Diet - that is where the profit comes from for the capitalist. The “body” that the purchaser is hoping to quasi-magically obtain does not circulate as such, it is only the desire for it which is preyed upon.
Gratuitous? Sure, but ain't they sexy?
Writing of images in magazines primarily Hein & Hein observe that;
What prevails, as expected, is in a most liberal sense erotic photography. Depending on target group and label, an average beauty and health ideal competes with expressive and experimental situations, where the frequent appearance of a doll-like stereotype in some campaigns and series of images cannot be overlooked. [...] The hypostatization of individual body functions within the frame of pornographic representations and cosmetic surgery signals a fragmentation of man as an optimizible modular system (320). 
Hein and Hein have a lot to say about body art in the avant garde, but I’ll leave that stuff (regretfully) to one side to follow the cult of the body insofar as it seems to me to parallel the popular consciousness of that notion.
... the cult of the threatened body is characterized by the vehement propagation of naturalness as the rescue from the pathologies of technical civilization—hence also from genetic engineering. The ‘scientifically secured’ prejudice is stationed on this level [...]
The cult of the beautiful body knows no genetic engineering, as far as we can see. People are free, attractive and strong without their own doing; including fitness and occasional assistance by means of plastic surgery. Compared with earlier, advertising has managed to relativize the image of the fashion doll and increasingly enacts self-confident charismatic types. It does not need to be emphasized that they thus create a virtuality of its own. The scepticism towards stereotypes present in the above-mentioned cult forms cannot be found here. Negation as a mode of differentiation is replaced by the new, demanding attention, which seems to prevalently serve criteria from the world of design (327-8).
If for Lacan, desire is, famously, the desire of the other - that is, if our innermost desires come to us from outside - how are we meant to understand the injunction that we ought not give ground on our desire? If to not give ground, means that we should not allow ourselves to swayed from obeying our desires it risks sounding like a superficial hedonism along the lines of, if you want it- just do it! But then if we think about where desires come from, we might ponder the ambiguity of “giving ground.” If a person is haunted by guilt because they have failed the desires of their parents and never became a medical doctor, even if, looked at from the outside, it seems that they have plenty in their life to be proud of and much to enjoy - the guilt here would be from having given ground, are we then asked to mark that as a mistake, as a failure to live up to “their” desire? It would seem that such a move would more fully lock analysands into socially mandated desire and thus psychoanalysis would be a tool of normalization and status quo maintenance. Yet neither of these answers seems to me to be correct. & to give ground might mean either to pushed from a course or to allow it push one, might it not?
Last night I found a text online and, probably because I ought to have been reading something else, I read a big chunk of Joanna Frueh’s Monster/beauty: Building the Body of Love. This book combines theoretical maters with anecdote and autobiography and ruminates a great deal about “beauty ideology” and the meanings that “beauty” has for women. I have a number of problems with some of its terminological choices, but that probably isn’t that important. What strikes me as interesting here is Frueh’s proposal of a counter concept to “beauty” as commonly posed (a perspective which she finds static and lifeless), namely “monster beauty.” & beyond this, I like very much her discussion of one’s body as creating and sustaining an “aesthetic/erotic fields.” Here are a few passages;
Women may be monster/beauties if we consciously depart from the idea that beauty is dependent on looks alone and instead create ourselves as aesthetic/erotic fields of simultaneously concentrated and resonant sensuousness. Doing so, we may begin to—or we may even finally— forget the anguishing “split between the dream [of beauty] and the observed physical reality” of ourselves. I am not suggesting that we forget the historical reality of that split or its effects on the bodies or the unconscious of women. Rather, because monster/beauty is a far more pleasurable condition than is the split state that stirs self-condemnation, I hope for our bodies themselves to forget the pain of beauty as a promise and an abstraction, so that joy, excitement, pleasure, humor, and comfort can fill us and pervade our aesthetic/erotic fields. As monster/beauties we can be hyperbolic, heretical, and heroic bodies, as are the body-builder, the mother and the stepmother, the teacher, the vampire, and the goddess Aphrodite. We can take pleasure in our beauty and be self-consciously erotic, while also understanding that the whole enterprise of aesthetic/erotic artifice is, to some degree, ridiculous. (Frueh 20) 
Monster/Beauty develops new modes of beauty that are visual. I agree with Phelan that “visual representation is ‘not all,’ “ because it marks a loss, in commodity culture, of the underasserted senses. For Pacteau, sight misrecognizes the beauty: she is the mother, perfectly inviting and comforting in a “sartorial skin” that is evidence of human beings’ “ ‘sublimation’ of touching into looking.” Monster/beauty reverses that process with a palpability essential to touch’s existence and operation. But I cannot betray the monster’s visual plenty through some theoretical sleight of hand. The monster’s purpose has been to show and be shown. Monster derives from the Latin monstrare, “to show”; and within the Western tradition, monsters are meant to be shown as warnings that visibly reveal unreason. Monster also derives from the Latin monstrum, “divine portent of misfortune.” The monster defies expectation, and therefore I use it as a symbol and agent of change. Monster/beauty heralds misfortune to beauty and its particular rationalizing of the human body into measurements, such as 36‒24‒36—the mantra of perfection in my adolescence—height and weight charts [...]. Monster/beauty deviates from the beauty ideal in which form, inflexibly ordered, is content; for monster/beauty shows off the more fully sensuous and intelligent content of soul-and-mind-inseparable-from-body. (Frueh 26)
Google>Image: "aesthetic-erotic field" ... I chose against the trend
Frueh is concerned in this text to assert and ethic of pleasure, specifically a pleasure taken in one’s monster/beauty as an antidote to the cultural mandates she and so many other find fault with. But there are also obstacles to such a path;
When damage exceeds pleasure as a primary mode of existence, pleasure stigmatizes the body. Lack of aesthetic/erotic failure is the “arrogance” that marks the body of pleasure as dismissible. Pleasure permits and exudes self-validation, but, [...] the body of pleasure, though powerful, cannot be granted outright authority. (Frueh 31)
There are moments when Frueh seems poised on the edge of recognizing jouissance as crucial here and not simply pleasure of one sort of another, but thus far in my reading, she has not taken that notion and its consequences on board. A few weeks ago, I had been emailing a good deal with another friend and I wrote to her about the plans to get back in shape that I mentioned at the beginning of this post. Here is some of what I said there (retooled slightly for inclusion here). 
I began be detailing both my obvious hedonism but then also my less recognized asceticism before writing...
Lacan talks about the möbius strip. Ignoring the specificity of his discussion entirely, I started to think of the two impulses above as being situated as the “opposed” sides of the möbius strip. That is, they seem “opposed”, but they are all one surface. If one could walk the möbius strip they would eventually reach the place they started but by going forward the entire time. Then I was thinking of Freud’s ‘principle of constancy’ which has to do with the level of excitation that the psyche tolerates. Freud speaks of it as if people want to maintain a sort of constant level of excitation, not too much and not too little (each of which would be a sort of displeasure). Presumably he recognizes that we want less excitation when sleeping than when awake and that how much we want varies as well during our waking hours, but that we have a sort of ‘range’ in which we operate and getting less or more is not to our liking. So, from there I began to connect this with certain ideas from Lacan, specifically about jouissance. It is neither pleasure or pain alone but something that is ‘beyond’ these - pleasure in pain, pain in pleasure. Think about marathon runners, we all know they ‘get off on’ the endorphins, but surely there is also a great deal of unambiguous pain as well. That they enjoy the endorphins is not enough of an answer to why someone would do this if we think of ourselves as pain-avoiding creatures. There are so many other examples. Have you ever met anyone who does nothing but speak about the calamities that are befalling them and who cannot stop talking about how they are suffering from this or that - have you ever thought that they are getting off on this litany of their unhappiness? That is jouissance, that “getting off on” something, whether it was horrible or a delight, drudgery or fascinating. We get that from things we like and those we don’t. If we then use Freud’s idea, that we have a ‘range’ which is where we tend to maintain ourselves, and what are desires and our psyche require is keeping that level, that of jouissance, within the acceptable range. Think of a love relationship that collapses and one of the pair, who had been just delirious with joy at his love is then just as “passionately” in despair. One could step back from the specifics of the person’s experience and see this as the psyche acting as a mechanism of sorts, keeping the level of excitation within the acceptable range. & now back to the möbius strip. The seeming difference of the two sides is only appearance, whether I am in hedonist mode or ascetic mode, I am mostly maintaining myself in the ‘range’ of jouissance, of “getting off on” something that I need. 
Thinking back to that shining moment of health and fitness in the late summer of 2008 - how I felt great and so forth - I find that Frueh’s idea of an aesthetic/erotic field of the body makes a great deal of immediate intuitive sense to me. & furthermore, it seems to me that discipline freely assumed can be productive of satisfaction and not simply submission to the superego’s command to attain the body beautiful. But I am not sure whether concepts like monster/beauty are enough - as concepts (thus as changes in consciousness, or knowing) are enough to fully resignify the doing such that it is not ensnared in the superego’s commands. 
So, the 1st question: how to do this “Return to the Body” without becoming an overt or covert body cultist and pawn of late capital’s lifestyle obsession?
Then the 2nd question: how to do this without the fantasy support that was so enabling in the past? 
. . . I know, that’s pretty vague unless you know me pretty well, but I’ll not be clarifying. Suffice to say that my previous “return” was wrapped up in a fantasy which I think was instrumental to my being so dedicated to it. That fantasy has definitely and fatally collapsed and I am uncertain about how the lack of such will effect my efforts this time around. We all need a fantasy I suspect.
…So, for those waiting for me to make some theoretical intervention in this - tough luck. I’m as lost as everyone else. I don’t want to be fat and soft, I want to be slim and tight. My libidinal attractions run similarly (if exhibiting variations too). I am as prone to fantasy as anyone else. I see and get the critique of all of this quite well, but that knowing does not seem to radically effect the doing that my body is engaged in (say, libidinal response which says yes, to the body on the left and no to the one on the right in the following picture without my intellectual appreciation of the critique this is susceptible to making one jot of difference).

I was provoked to write this rambling post by a comment that uncomfortably suggested my submission to the cult of the body, and yet I cannot exculpate myself from that. Even as imagining that the cult of the body has totally hegemonized the field of all desires regarding the body strikes me as wrong.

Susanne Sommers with the Thigh-Master
So, is there no room for thinking about a “Return to the Body” which has goals not overdetermined by these cultural forces? Is there a way to like or not like what one finds in the mirror that is not just another version of the internet site “Hot or Not” (a paradigm made use of by many dating website these days). Surely no one will despise me for wanting to be healthier, live longer, etc… right? But if I pony up for a thigh master or Hawaiian Chair or whatever, maybe you should. You should at least laugh. That said, their was an infomercial for the Hawaiian Chair which used to play at a Vietnamese restaurant I often ate at. Unlike the chair show in this clip, it was not powered, one had to make it move in those circles - I thought that looked pretty funny and maybe sort of fun.